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This study examines the direct role played by governments of the SSA low-income countries to 
attract potential FDI inflows in their accountabilities as advocates of public sector management 
and institutions for poverty reduction. The study employs panel data for 24 SSA low-income 
economies over the period 2005-2015. Panel unit root tests by IPS and Fisher-ADF are applied to 
test for data stationarity thus furthering the conduct of panel cointegration analysis using Pedroni 
tests. Both tests confirm for data stationarity and long-run relationships. The major finding using 
GMM estimator reveals that public sector in SSA low-income economies negatively influence 
FDI inflows. This implies that public sector is plagued with lack of transparency, accountability 
and corruption in delivering public services. Thus, the authorities and policy makers in SSA low-
income economies need to undertake meticulous measures by strengthening public institutions 
that adhere to the rule of law, accountability for achieving human development, safety and 
fairness to general public. The failure of public sector instigates catastrophe for the survival of 
private sector and market mechanisms. Moreover, amiable regulations, rule of law and control of 
corruption are vital for public and private sectors to work together towards poverty alleviation.  
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1. Introduction  
The financial liberalization that emerged between 1980s and 1990s capitalised on loosening the 
international investment barriers for enacting entrée international markets. Thus, the private 
investment flows found the root to migrate around the world either within industrial nations or 
between industrial and developing countries (Mishkin, 2007). This era experienced policy 
restructuring and subsequently the World Bank argued the developing economies including SSA 
low-income economies to adopt the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) to fostering their 
economies. Among the key reforms undertaken by SAPs was the public sector reforms (de Waal, 
2007; Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2011).  
 
The need for public sector reforms emanated from the poor performance of public institutions 
and governance which among other roles are responsible for active private sector (Nhema, 2016; 
World Bank, 2009). The deteriorated economic growth in 1980s among African countries 
including SSA low-income economies was associated with inefficacy of traditional public 
administration. The functioning of private sector which is a backbone to the economic growth 
depends on functional public sector (AfDB, 2013). Initially, public sectors in SSA low-income 
countries were responsible to control economies and thus, reforms intended to facilitate optimal 
output and economic growth for tangible poverty reduction (Lekorwe, 2010). 
 
Institutional quality and governance accelerate the catching up of the economic growth of any 
country (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, & Thaicharoen, 2003; Kant, 2016; North, 1990, 2016; 
Yildirim, 2016). Institutions and governance are cornerstones for creating amiably regulatory 
environment that attracts FDI inflows especially for non-rich resource countries including SSA 
low-income countries (Asiedu, 2006). FDI inflows are argued to be vehicles towards economic 
growth and poverty alleviation. For the host country, FDI facilitate job creation, technological 
transfer, capital formation and development of human skills which are necessary for solid 
poverty reduction. Because of the benefits attached with FDI inflows, many countries would like 
to attract significant basket of FDI. Thus, efficacy of public sector in SSA low income countries 
need be attached with the spill lover benefits of attracting FDI inflows for combating poverty.  
 
Regardless of FDI inflows being the most reliable source of capital flow compared to other 
private investments, FDI inflows in SSA low income countries have been increasing at 
decreasing rate (UNCTAD, 2016). Countries with comparative advantages like rich natural 
resource countries attract potential FDI inflows than non-rich natural resources countries. The 
justification for low share of FDI inflows to SSA low-income countries is depicted on figure1 
that shows the trend of FDI inflows for the period 2000 to 2015. 
 
 





Figure 1: Trend of FDI inflows (US$ Millions) to SSA from 2000-2015  
Source: UNCTAD (2016) 
 
The FDI inflows are catalyst for economic growth and are the stepping stones for country’s 
integration into regional and global markets. However, it is very hard to achieve potential 
dividends of FDI inflows without concrete public sector management that creates friendly 
regulatory business environment that covers institutions and governance. Moreover, concrete 
public sector management is required to enforce the complementarity between domestic and 
foreign investment to enhance productivity.  
     
The technological and socioeconomic adjustments were among challenges faced performance of 
public sector management in Africa. To overcome these challenges necessary for improving 
operations of public sector, African countries adopted the administrative framework known as 
New Public Management (NPM) in 1990s. The NPM was intended to overcome shortcoming of 
traditional public administration through enhancing institutional capacity, result-oriented 
technique, transparency and public accountability (Pollitt, 2007; Rubakula, 2014; Vyas-
Doorgapersad, 2011). However, SSA low income countries were (are) reluctant to enforce the 
ingredients of the NPM model for good institutions and governance and thus SSA lag far behind 
(Rubakula, 2014; Schuppan, 2009). Therefore, challenges facing public sector in SSA low 
income countries including weak institutions, unaccountability, weird public services ethics, and 
corruption have constrained the scope, pace and efficacy of services delivered.  
 
The public sector management and institution in SSA low income countries should aim at 
delivering better public services to uplift living standard of people where majority are poor. The 
assessment by the United Nations through the Millennium Development Goal revealed that the 
level of poverty in SSA low income is still high because more than 40 percent of the population 
lives in poverty environment (United Nations, 2015b). Thus, governments of SSA low income 
nations are argued to facilitate domestic savings through FDI inflows where its multiplier effect 
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would help to reduce poverty. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the roles played by the 
governments of SSA low-income countries in strenghthening public sector structure. The 
effective public sector management and institution qualifies for significant development 
especially when capitalise on location advantages that encourages investment projects (Bjorvatn, 
Kind, & Nordås, 2002; Nhema, 2016).  
 
Public sector management and institution which is among four clusters of Country Policy and 
Instituions Assessment (CPIA) established by the World Bank covers five components that are 
highlighted in table 1 which are mainly institutional capacity and governance. However, the 
displayed poor performance of the components in this cluster triggers the need to build 
governance and institutional capacity among low incoms countries in SSA which are necessary 
blocks to economic performance. Note that in 2015 the scores for components transparency, 
accountability and corruption in public sector management was 2.7 which is low (1 = low, 6 = 
high) where higher score implies better rating (World Bank, 2016).  
 
Table 1: The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
Clusters 














i. Trade i. Gender equality 
i. Property rights and 
rule based governance 
ii. Fiscal policy 
ii. Financial 
sector 
ii. Equity of public 
resources  use 
ii. Quality of budgetary 
and financial 
management 




iii. Building human 
resources 
iii. Efficiency of revenue 
mobilisation 
  
iv. Social protection 
and labour 
iv. Quality of public 
administration 






corruption  in the 
public sector 
Source: World Bank (2009)  
 
There has been a dearth of empirical studies that examines the role played by host country’s 
public sector management and institutions towards FDI inflows as a strategy for solid poverty 
reduction in SSA low-income economies. Thus, this study examines the direct impact exerted by 
governments of host countries to attract potential FDI in their responsibilities as advocates of 
public management and institutions. Thus, are the pro-public sector management in SSA low-
income economies friendly to potential FDI inflows for poverty reduction? 
 
This study is important for reasons that, the sound private sector solely depends on the efficacy 
public sector. Thus, functional public sector reinforces thriving of private sector and market 
mechanisms that are catalysts for attracting potential FDI inflows necessarily for poverty 
eradication. Additionally, this study reconsiders that rigorous efforts are needed to reinforce pro-
poor development reforms and policies on regulatory frameworks among SSA low-income 
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countries to reduce extreme poverty as it was reported by United Nations based on their 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Assessment that more than 40 percent of the 
population in SSA are living in extreme poverty (United Nations, 2015a).  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Overview of Public Sector Management and Institutions 
Public sector refers to those organisations (including central and local governments) and 
agencies that are owned and operated by the government for the purpose of delivering goods or 
services to its citizens. The public sector being a pivotal to excelling country’s economy has core 
role of creating appropriate and conducive environment necessarily for other sectors of 
economies including private sector to thrive optimally (Antwi & Analoui, 2008; Ayee, 2005; 
United Nations, 2010).  
 
The public sector management and institution collectively as institutions and governance is 
among four clusters of Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) established by the 
World Bank. The CPIA examines Sub-Saharan Africa’s muscles to reinforce reforms for 
sustainable growth, efficacy utilization of development assistances and poverty reduction 
(Independent Evaluation Group, 2010; World Bank, 2009). On this connection, the other three 
clusters of CPIA include economic management cluster, structural policies cluster and policies 
for social inclusion and equity cluster. These four clusters were categorised from a total of 16 
components (World Bank, 2009).  
 
More formally, public sector management and institutions cluster constitutes five components 
namely the property rights and rule based governance, the quality budgetary and financial 
management, the efficiency revenue mobilisation, the quality of public administration and the 
transparency, accountability and corruption in public services (World Bank, 2009). These 
components measure the efficacy of the governments for timely response on citizen demands, 
solid financial management, reinforcement of rule of law that is applicable to everyone, justice 
on revenue collections and transparency processes that are not colluded with corruption. In 
general, the World Bank calculates the CPIA score for each country to assist the International 
Development Assistance (IDA) when allocating resources to poor countries. The CPIA score 
ranges from 1 = low, to 6 = high; the higher the score the better institutions and governance. The 
resource allocation is established under the performance-based allocation (World Bank, 2009).  
 
The structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that were initiated by the World Bank in 1980s 
have the root from the economic crunch among African countries including SSA low-income 
economies. Thus, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) intended to be the catalyst for 
building quality institutions and governance for fostering economic growth. The public sector 
reforms were among the earlier reforms initiated by SAPs to move from traditional public 
administration to new public management (de Waal, 2007; Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2011). The need 
for new public management (NPM) emanates from the truth that, the efficient and effective 
public sector management creates best practices for economic growth and poverty eradication 
(Antwi & Analoui, 2008; Independent Evaluation Group, 2008; United Nations, 2010).  
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2.2 Public Sector Management and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows 
The presence of FDI inflows to host countries constitutes several advantages including job 
creation, technological transfer, sources of financing, an access to international markets, 
development of human capital, marketing know-how and spill over benefits toward poverty 
reduction. On this connection, FDI inflows are sometimes linked with improvement of the 
domestic investments and promote economic growth of the host country (Adams, 2009; Adams, 
Sakyi, & Opoku, 2016). In general, advantages that are created by FDI inflows to the host 
country are dual notably the total factor productivity (TFP) and capital accumulation (Adams, 
2009; Mahmoodi & Mahmoodi, 2016; Nath, 2009).  
 
Premised with the above, the capital accumulation and total factor productivity constitute the 
theoretical perspective populated by the modernisation theory of FDI inflows to the host country. 
The theory argues that capital investment is the necessary tool for promoting economic growth in 
developing economies and thus, the source of capital investment comes from FDI inflows 
(Choong & Lam, 2011; Drigă, 2011). However, the FDI inflows could bring negative impact to 
the host country if sector of economies are weakly correlated. This means that, FDI inflows 
could bring negative impact if it does not create the multiplier effect especially when the demand 
of one sector creates weak demand to another sector. Thus, the above argument connote the 
needy for functional demand linkage between sectors and not one sector to be barrier to another 
sector (Adams, 2009; Morisset, 2000).  
 
The extant literatures have identified various factors including natural resources and market size 
to attract FDI inflows in SSA (Asiedu, 2006; Morisset, 2000). The rich resource countries like 
South Africa, Nigeria and Angola absorb a bulky share of total FDI inflows compared to other 
non-rich resource countries including the SSA low-income countries. However, the resource rich 
countries cannot  attract FDI inflows outside the resource sectors (Asiedu, 2006; Sy & 
Rakotondrazaka, 2015).   
 
However, literatures on the determinants of FDI inflows by the host countries especially SSA 
low-income economies emphasise building quality institutions and governance to accelerate FDI 
inflows. Factors like transparency, accountability and corruption collectively constitute quality 
institutions and governance which are directly related with poverty reduction (Bräutigam & 
Knack, 2014; Hyden, 2007). For instance, Bräutigam and Knack (2014) argued that the declining 
capital investments among African countries including the SSA low-income countries 
encompasses meagre institutions, rule of law that are not applicable for everyone, dearth of 
government accountability and rampant corruption. This can be argued that, the ingredients of 
the public sector management constitute unpleasant performance when delivering public goods 
or services.  
 
Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer (2007) argued that the pioneering factors that accelerate FDI 
inflows to the host countries are attached with pleasant institutions. That means country that 
enforce good governance should attract potential FDI inflows and that the multiplier effect can 
be achieved provided that there is demand linkage among sectors. However, uncertainties in 
public institutions like corruption would fly away the FDI inflows. 
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The empirical study carried by Gani (2007) on a selected sample from Asia and Latin America 
countries concluded that governance indicators of government effectiveness, rule of law, control 
of corruption, regulatory quality and political stability have positive and statistically significant 
relationship with FDI inflows. This conclusion concur with what was advocated by Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009); Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatn (1999) that the governance 
indicators namely voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, 
government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and control of corruption create good 
atmosphere for a country to attract potential FDI inflows.  
 
3. Methodology 
This study employed the panel data for 24 selected SSA low income countries over the period 
2005-2015. These years 2005 and 2015 were selected because the first dataset of CPIA scores 
were published by World Bank in 2005 and the last update was made in March 2017 for 2015 
dataset. The World Bank income classification 2016 classified 27 countries in SSA as the low-
income economies. The choice for 24 countries based on the data availability whereby Eritrea, 
Somalia and South Sudan were excluded.  
 
This study employed panel data because countries in SSA low-income are heterogeneous and 
thus, panel data accounts for individual heterogeneity and can control for any spurious 
correlations (Arellano, 2004). Moreover, panel data was recommended because of its superiority 
over other types of data when studying changes in economic policy (Baltagi, 2005; Hsiao, 2003). 
The list of 24 SSA low-income countries is attached on  Appendix A. 
 
3.1 Variables of the Study 
3.1.1 Dependent Variable 
This study employed the FDI inflows as the dependent variable. The FDI inflows to the SSA low 
income countries have increased for sometimes however at the decreasing rate. Countries that 
enforce implementation of regulatory environment on institutions and governance escalate the 
catching-up of the FDI inflows. Thus, the FDI inflows were normalised or standardised by taking 
the logarithm of foreign investment for the period 2005 to 2015. Data for FDI inflows were 
collected from UNCTAD (2016). 
 
3.1.2 Independent variables 
This study examines the role played by the public sector management and institutions to enhance 
FDI inflows among 24 SSA low income economies from 2005-2015. The public sector cluster is 
a numerical index made up of five components known as governance criteria. This CPIA cluster 
receives significant attention than other three CPIA clusters because it demonstrates the property 
rights and rule based governance, accountability of the government, transparency, efficiency and 
equity of government expenditures necessary for economic growth. The CPIA scores have a 
scale from 1 which is low score to 6 which is maxima and best score. In 2015, the CPIA score 
for public sector management and institutions in SSA was 3.2 while the criteria for 
accountability, transparency and corruption were poorly graded at 2.7. Public sector management 
and institutions is an index of five components which are highlighted in table 1. This study 
employed this index of public sector reform. 
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3.1.3 Control variables 
Numerous literatures have identified several variables for the host country to attract FDI inflows. 
These variables are either observable or unobservable and they are host country’s specific 
characteristics. However, the unobserved heterogeneity are the sources for  indogeneity problem. 
Thus, the control variables are included in the model because they can influence FDI inflows and 
account for unobserved heterogeneity. The resource endownment and market size are regarded 
as main determinants of FDI in SSA (Asiedu, 2006; Morisset, 2000). However, the SSA low-
income countries are non-rich resource countries and thus, the relationship between natural 
resources and FDI is established. Moreover, larger market size have opportunity to exploit 
economies of scale necessary for attracting FDI inflows (Asiedu, 2006; Morisset, 2000). 
However, SSA low income countries are characterised with small market size which can be hard 
to absorp resource necessary for FDI inflows. Thus, small market size would likely not be 
favourable for potential FDI (Farole & Winkler, 2014).  
 
Another factor necessary to explain FDI in SSA low income economies include infrastructure 
(Asiedu, 2002, 2006). Developed and favourable pysical infrastructure facilitates the catching up 
of potential FDI inflows (Asiedu, 2002; Cleeve, 2012). It should be noted that in order to avoid 
ommision biasness, infractructure should be widely measured by many variables and not only by 
a common indicator the fixed telephone per 1000 population. This is because there is evolution 
of mobile phones which surpass fixed telephones main lines which explain only the availability 
but not about the reliability (Asiedu, 2004; Calderón & Servén, 2008). Thus, to account for 
endogeneity problem and ensure the reliability of infrastructure, this study employed principal 
component analysis (PCA) to develop and index based on three variables: i) fixed telephone per 
100 population purposely to measure availability of telephone, ii) gross fixed capital formation 
as percentage of GDP to measure land improvements, plant, machinery and equipment available 
to the host country and iii) the mobile cellular subscription per 100 people. This service is 
available to the public to provide quick access to the public switched telephone network using 
technology; this variable measures the reliability of infrastructure. These variables are most 
common to SSA low-income economies as they are affected geographically and some are 
landlocked countries where water transport does not apply to all countries and thus transport cost 
might multiply. 
 
Furthermore, inflation was included as control variable and is among macroeconomic factors that 
impacts FDI inflows in SSA low income economies. In general, the SSA low income countries is 
associated with unstable macroeconomic factors. High inflation imply unfavourable environment 
for economic condition for the host country (Asiedu, 2002; Cleeve, 2012; Neuhaus, 2006; Yartey 
& Adjasi, 2007). Unstable macroecomic factors paticularly inflation have negative impact 
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Table 2: Variables and Data sources 
Variable Expected sign Description Data Source 
lnFDI  
FDI iflows is measured by the natural 
logarithm of FDI inflows in a host country 
UNCTAD, WDI 
lnCPI - 
Inflation is measured by natural logarithm of 
consumer prices (annual %) 
World Bank (WDI) 
lnGDPP + 
Market size is measured by Natural logarithm 
of GDP per capita  
World Bank (WDI) 
lnINFRAST + 
Infrastructure is measured by natural logarithm 
of Princial component Analysis (PCA) on fixed 
telephone, gross fixed capital formation and 
electricity power transmission. 
World Bank (WDI) 
lnNRR + Natural logarithm of natural resources World Bank (WDI) 
lnPSMI + 
Public sectro is measured by Natural logarithm 
of public sector management and institutions 
ranges between 1 low to 6 high 
World Bank (WDI) 
 
3.2 Model Specification  
The relationship between the Public sector management and institutions and FDI inflows was 
















itititiit PSMIZFDI                                                                         (2) 
Whereby the dependent variable  stands for the natural logarithm of foreign direct 
investment in country  at time ;  is the coefficient for control variables  namely the natural 
resources, market size, infrastructure and inflation;   is the natural logarithm of public 
sector management and institutions and   is the error term. The first model eqn.1 was intended 
to measure the impact of control variables simply natural resources, market size, inflation and 
infrastructure towards FDI inflows. The second model eqn.2 measures the role of public sector 
towards FDI given other variables. 
 
3.3 Discussion of Empirical Results 
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 summarises the statistics for the variables of this study. This study has a total of 264 
observations (N) associated with 24 SSA low-income countries for a period of 11 years counted 
from 2005-2015. This size is adequate to provide concise status of public sector management and 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable LN(FDI) LN(CPI) LN(GDPP) LN(INFRAST) LN(NRR) LN(PSMI) 
 Mean  6.9296  4.0397  3.9058 -0.7635  2.4493  1.0829 
 Median  6.7906  3.9321  3.9134 -0.6050  2.4221  1.0986 
 Maximum  8.8357  19.2579  4.1872  1.5308  4.0537  1.5041 
 Minimum  3.1968  2.2152  2.2792 -9.0280  0.7771  0.4055 
Std Deviation 0.4983 1.0508 0.1314 1.5250  0.6934  0.2558 
 Observations  264  264  264  264  264  264 
Source: Author computation 
The notation: lnFDI is the measure for FDI, lnCPI is a measure for inflation, lnGDPP is a measure for market size, 
lnINFRAST is measure for infrastructure, lnNRR is a measure for natural resources and lnPSMI is a measure for 
public sector management and institutions. 
 
The dependent variable of this study is FDI inflows (US$ Millions). Table 3 shows that on 
average, FDI inflow to SSA low-income countries from 2005 to 2015 was estimated to 
US$322.1 Millions (Note that: mean value of LN(FDI) = 6.9296 as shown in table 3; therefore to 
compute for FDI, it is required to go for  exponential form of (lnFDI) and standardisation of 
[EXP(6.9396)]). This implies that, the average FDI inflows to SSA low-income countries have 
been very low necessary to generate expected impacts toward poverty reduction. The maximum 
FDI inflows were around US$6,175.4 Millions. However, public sector management have 
explanations to provide based on the overall transparency and public accountability. On the other 
hand, average inflation in the region from 2005 to 2015 has been disappointing at 56.81. This 
high value of inflation is associated with Zimbabwe hyperinflation in 2007 and 2008 but in 
current years the situation has settled. However, unstable macroeconomic factors divert potential 
FDI inflows. 
 
3.3.2 Panel Unit Root Tests 
For the purpose of policy making and forecasting, data were tested for their stationarity. Testing 
for data stationarity is important because making decision on non-stationary data may result into 
implementing wrong policy. Data have tendency to fluctuate overtime whenever shock arises 
thus, the IPS and Fisher – ADF tests were employed to test for data stationarity (Keong, 2007). 
These two tests were employed because each test account for individual heterogeneity concurant 
with the heterogeneity among the SSA low-income countries. Results for panel unit root tests are 
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Source: Author computation. 
 
The results in table 4 show that variables have unity root at level thus, the null hypothesis of 
unity root (non-stationary) cannot be rejected. Hence, the first difference was conducted to 
creating data stationarity which is necessary criteria for consistence forecasting and policy 
implications. It is very harm to make decision on non-stationary data especially in SSA low-
income economies where macroeconomic factors are unstable and infrastructure are not reliable. 
The first difference indicates that it is necessary to reject the null hypothesis of unit root at 1 
percent level of significance. Thus, the data stationarity signifies presence of data stability 
necessary to absorb short and long term shocks and useful for policy implementation and 
forecasting. Data stationarity imply that any intrusion brought by fluctuations will be immersed 
and become part of the system (Baltagi & Kao, 2000; Keong, 2007).  
 
3.3.3 The Pedroni Panel Cointegration Test 
The stationarity among data as indicated by IPS and Fisher-ADF tests is the necessary condition 
to conduct the panel cointegration test. Panel cointegration test intends to examine the long run 
relationship between variables. This study employed Pedroni (2004) panel cointegration tests 
because they are built on the assumption that data are heterogeneous. This assumption of 
heterogeneous is consistent with this study because SSA low-income countries have different 
specific characteristics. Results for panel cointegration analysis are presented in table 5. 
 
 
                                                          
4 The Null Hypothesis: Unit root (Individual Unit root process). The asterisks ***,  ** and * imply significant at 1% 
, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-
square distribution. IPS tests statistics are computed using asymptotic normality. Automatic lag length selection 
based on SIC for both IPS and Fisher ADF tests.  
The notation: lnFDI is the measure for FDI, lnCPI is a measure for inflation, lnGDPP is a measure for market size, 
lnINFRAST is measure for infrastructure, lnNRR is a measure for natural resources and lnPSMI is a measure for 
public sector management and institutions. 
 
Variables 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) FISHER - ADF 
Level (trend and intercept) 
First Difference 
(intercept) 
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Table 5: Pedroni (2004) Cointegration Tests 
Deterministic intercept and trend No deterministic intercept or trend 
Within - Dimension Within - Dimension 
 Statistic P-value  Statistics P-value 
Panel v-Statistic -6.8735 1.0000 Panel v-Statistic -4.4347 1.0000 
Panel rho-Statistic 5.5153 1.0000 Panel rho-Statistic 2.9946 0.9986 
Panel PP-Statistic -35.2136 0.0000*** Panel PP-Statistic -17.5676 0.0000*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -10.8704 0.0000*** Panel ADF-Statistic -8.7439 0.0000*** 
Between - dimension Between - dimension 
Group rho-Statistic 7.8818 1.0000 Group rho-Statistic 6.0857 1.0000 
Group PP-Statistic -25.0700 0.0000*** Group PP-Statistic -17.3292 0.0000*** 
Group ADF-Statistic -7.6276 0.0000*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.4601 0.0000*** 
 Source: Author computation. 
Note: Null Hypothesis: No cointegration. The asterisks *** implies the rejection of Null Hypothesis at 1 percent 
significance level Automatic lag length selection based on SIC 
 
The results presented in table 5 reveal that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected 
at 1 percent level of significance. According to Pedron (2004), if more than half of seven tests 
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegartion then data have long run relationship. Therefore, 
data for this study are cointegrated because four tests reject the null hypothesis. 
 
3.3.4 The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
The regression model comprises of dependent variable, independent variables and an error term. 
The error term or residuals are unobservable and have the tendency to correlate with regressors 
to impact dependent variable. These are unobserved heterogeneity which are the key sources of 
endogenous problems and are responsible for generating biased and inconsistent parameters 
especially when the study employs the OLS estimator. To account for the endogenous problems 
caused by unobserved heterogeneity, dynamic endogeneity and simultaneity (Hu & Izumida, 
2008; Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2015; Zhou, Faff, & Alpert, 2014), this study employed the 
GMM estimator to circumvent the likelihood of reporting spurious results.  
 
It is widely acknowledged that GMM estiamtor generates consitent and unbiased estimates 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991; Blundell & Bond, 1998; Keong, 2007; Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 
2012). The superiority of the GMM emanate from the automatic use of lagged dependent 
variable and more significantly the GMM is attached with valid instrumental variables. The 
instrumental variables are argued to be valid because they are uncorrelated with regressors and 
thus, are relevant and exogeneous. The GMM estimator is a dynamic model rather than a static 
model because it can manage dynamic nature of performance (Wintoki et al., 2012). Thus, based 
on eqn.2, the GMM dynamic panel model for estimating parameters takes the following form. 
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ititiittiit ZPSMIFDIFDI                                (3) 
 
Where  stands for the natural logarithm of foreign direct investment in country  at time ; 
 stands for the natural logarithm of lagged foreign direct investment;   is the 
coefficient for natural logarithms of control variables  namely the natural resources, market 
size, physical infrastructure and inflation;   is the natural logarithm of public sector 
management and institutions;   is error term. Note that to avoid model misspecification, the 
dependent variable has two lags for intention of capturing all the past information regarding the 
FDI inflows (Wintoki et al., 2012). The regression output by GMM is presented in table 6. 
 
Table 6: The GMM Regression output  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 































lnPSMI   -0.2003 
-2.0062** 
(0.0463) 
S.E. of Regression 0.4568 0.5118 
J – Statistics 23.2021 21.3205 
Prob(J – Statistics) 0.2789 0.2635 
       Source: Author computation 
The asteriks *** and ** imply significant at 1% and 5% level of significant respectively; p-value is in brackets. 
The notation: lnFDI is the measure for FDI, lnCPI is a measure for inflation, lnGDPP is a measure for market 
size, lnINFRAST is measure for infrastructure, lnNRR is a measure for natural resources and lnPSMI is a 
measure for public sector management and institutions. 
 
Initial discussion is based on the lagged dependent variable namely LNFDI (-1) which is 
negative and statistically significant at 1 per cent significance level. According to Flannery and 
Hankins (2013); Law and Azman-Saini (2008); Wintoki et al. (2012) the lagged dependent is 
supposed to be statistically significant to justify the validity of instruments used. Moreover, the 
validity of instrument is justified by the value of probabilities for J-statistics which are supposed 
to be above 10 per cent. Hence, the empirical results from the dynamic GMM estimator are 
appropriate for making statistical inferences. 
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The first model (Model 1) has examined the role of control variables available to the host 
country towards potential FDI inflows. The results show that all the variables inflation, market 
size, infrastructure and natural resources achieve the hypothesised signs and are statistically 
significant. The negative coefficient for inflation is significant at 5 percent significance level, 
while other variables are significant at 1 percent significance level. The negatively and 
statistically significant coefficient for inflation implies that unstable macroeconomic factor 
among the SSA low-income diverts potential FDI inflows. This result is in line with (Asiedu, 
2002; Cleeve, 2012; Neuhaus, 2006; Yartey & Adjasi, 2007). Higher inflation rates implies 
unstable economic condition and hence rises uncertainty for potential FDI inflows. Thus, an 
increase of 1 percent in inflation deteriorates FDI inflows by 0.0821 percent. 
 
However, the second model (Model 2) has different result on market size and perhaps explains 
the real situation pertaining the SSA low-income economies. The introduction of public sector 
management and institutions in the model converted the coefficient of market size from positive 
to negative. The market size as measured by GDP per capita becomes negatively and statistically 
significant at 1 percent significance level. Meanwhile, the coefficient of public sector 
management and institutions is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent significance 
level. The negative relationship between market size and FDI indicates that the domestic markets 
in SSA low-income countries are small and are small in terms of absorptive capacity. The 
purchasing power in the small domestic markets do not promote scale economies necessary to 
promote potential FDI. This result is in similar argument with (Asiedu, 2006; Morisset, 2000; 
World Bank, n.d.).  
 
Thus, the efficiency of government services, accountability and level of corruption in SSA low-
income countries are among the reasons for the small absorptive capacity. The public sector 
cluster scored low CPIA score in 2015 of 0.3 which is below the average score of 3.2 (World 
Bank, 2016). Moreover, the weak performance of public sector cluster was contributed by weak 
performance of transparency, government accountability and corruption which scored 2.7 (World 
Bank, 2016). Thus, an increase of 1 percent in market size will deteriorate FDI inflow in SSA 
low-income countries by 0.2003 percent. In general, the domestic financial markets are potential 
vehicles for foreign investors to borrow domestically. However, domestic markets among SSA 
low-income countries are less developed to afford huge borrowing demands by foreign investors 
to expand their operations.  
 
Moreover, the negatively and statistically significant of public sector management and 
institutions towards FDI inflows implies weak public sector among the SSA low-income 
countries. The laxity to enforce the ingredients of new public management (NPM) has negative 
consequences among the SSA low-income economies. The NPM model requires an emphasis on 
accountability through engaging in delegation, decentralisation, results-oriented and 
agencification for reducing bureaucracy. Thus, weak public sector management and institutions 
contribute towards low FDI inflows in SSA low-income economies. In general, successful 
institutions and governance for potential FDI inflows are measured based on the displayed level 
of accountability and transparency (Sumanjeet, 2015).  
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Note that public and private sectors are the tools for improving standard of living. The 
partnership in these sectors are of paramount towards fighting rampant corruption because 
corruption is not confined only to public sector it hits even the private sectors (Hodgson & Jiang, 
2007). Thus, corruption has to be fought from both directions because corrupion is argued as 
obtacle for entry FDI inflows and thus corruption facilitate informality.   
 
4. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This study examines the direct role played by governments of the SSA low-income countries to 
attract potential FDI inflows in their responsibilities as advocates of public sector management 
and institutions for poverty reduction. The study employs panel data of 24 SSA low-income 
economies for the period 2005-2015. Panel unit root IPS and Fisher-ADF tests were employed to 
test data stationarity for further conduct of panel cointegration analysis by Pedroni (2004). Data 
for this study are stationary and have long-run relationship which is necessary and sufficient 
condition for policy implications and forecasting. 
 
Results of this study reveal that public sector management and institutions in SSA low-income 
economies are negatively and statistically significant toward FDI inflows at 5 percent level of 
significance. This implies that public sector among SSA low-income countries is overwhelmed 
with lack of transparency, accountability and corruption in delivering public services. 
Transparency in this perspective refers to the failure to reveal crucial information and 
institutional climate pertaining to making investment decision. The lack of transparency creates 
mask bribery and exaggerated transaction costs which are hostile for FDI inflows. In reality no 
single nation in the world can declare that is corruption-free however, the degree of corruption 
among countries is different. It is also claimed that the level of corruption among SSA low-
income economies is very high. According to the corruption perception index (CPI) 2016, the 
extent of corruption in public sector among SSA low-income countries stands at an average of 
about 30 from 2012-2016 (0 = highly corrupt, 100 = very clean) in a sample of 176 countries 
(Transparency International, 2017). The low score of 30 implies weak public institutions and 
governance in delivering public goods or services. 
 
Thus, results of this study alert the governments and policy makers in SSA low income countries 
to undertake meticulous measures by strengthening public institutions that adhere to the rule of 
law and accountable for offering human development goods or services, safety and fairness to 
general public. The failure of public sector instigates catastrophe for the wellbeing of private 
sector and market mechanisms. Moreover, public sector is supposed to build friendly 
environment for private sector to prosper which in turn triggers potential FDI inflows among 
SSA low-income countries. In general, friendly environment that include regulatory quality, rule 
of law and control of corruption are central factors for public sector and private sector to work 
together.  
 
Furthermore, transparency and accountability should be brought together for combating 
corruption in public services. Sound domestic policies and governance play significant roles 
towards FDI inflows to the host country. The persistence of corruption and lack of transparency 
in delivering public services among SSA low-income states deteriorate viable investments and 
create poor disproportionately and eventually hinders efforts to eradicate poverty. In addition, 
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there should not be illusion or myth among SSA low-income countries authorities that, 
corruption is attached to low income instead of poor governance. Thus, persistent endemic 
corruption in the region jeopardises accountability among government officials and weakens 
efforts for poverty reduction.   
 
Appendix A: 24 SSA Low-Income Economies 
S/N Country  S/N Country  
1 Benin 13 Madagascar 
2 Burkina Faso 14 Malawi 
3 Burundi 15 Mali 
4 Central African Republic 16 Mozambique 
5 Chad 17 Niger 
6 Comoros 18 Rwanda 
7 Congo Democratic Republic 19 Senegal 
8 Ethiopia 20 Sierra Leone 
9 Gambia 21 Tanzania 
10 Guinea 22 Togo 
11 Guinea-Bissau 23 Uganda 
12 Liberia 24 Zimbabwe 
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